Tournaments, where ordinal position determines rewards, are an important component of our economy. By studying sporting tournaments, we hope to shed light on the nature of other economically significant tournaments where data may be less readily available. We separately quantify the sorting and incentive effects of tournament prizes by employing a novel two-part model which we apply to a unique data set of road running race results.
Introduction
Tournaments are characterized by rewards determined by ordinal position: in tournaments it is relative output, and not absolute output, that determines payment.
Competitions of this type appear often in the economy. Examples include such diverse situations as promotions in corporations and universities, patent races, political elections, and sporting events. In this paper we study sporting tournaments where relatively rich data can be found. By doing so we hope to shed light on the nature of other more economically significant tournaments where data may be less readily available.
In general, tournaments are used as mechanisms to induce desired behavior by the participants. For example, promotion based on relative performance may serve to motivate employees to work hard, and prizes in sporting events based on competitors' finishing positions may motivate participants to train hard prior to an event and to exert effort in the event itself. In tournaments, prize values and structure are chosen by the tournament organizers in light of the organizers' particular objectives.
As discussed in Section 2.3, to date empirical studies of sporting events have provided ambiguous results in regards to the incentive effects of prizes. As a consequence, we are particularly interested in investigating whether tournament prizes have a measurable impact on the behavior of participants. This appears to be an important prerequisite if sports events are to offer an appropriate environment to test theories that may be applicable in other economically important situations.
Although there are a wide range of questions that researchers have considered concerning tournament design and the behavior of tournament participants, as a practical matter researchers have most often considered "within" tournament issues rather than "between" tournament issues. The focus has usually been on the incentive effect of prizes on the behavior of participants, assuming they are irrevocably committed to a particular tournament. In general, less attention has been given to the broader question of how participants sort into particular tournaments based on prizes and other tournament characteristics.
We propose a two-part model to examine the results from road running races which enables us to separately quantify the effect of prizes on race choice (the "sorting" effect) and on race speed (the "incentive" effect). The data set we use is unique and, unlike the data sets used in prior studies we are aware of, it includes runners that did not win prizes.
To the best of our knowledge, our method to separately model sorting and incentive effects is new. Using our methodology, we demonstrate that both sorting and incentive effects are present in the races we examine, and we are able to quantify their impacts. We also perform a counterfactual analysis and show how a hypothetical change in prizes would be predicted to change race participation and speed.
Relevant Literature
We summarize below three categories of tournament research that are relevant to our investigation: (1) theoretical work; (2) experimental studies; and (3) sports-related empirical studies. Other research topics that use ideas from tournaments include patent races, executive compensation and promotions in corporations and universities.
Theoretical
Contrary to the impression that might be acquired by a casual reader of the empirical literature regarding tournaments, there is no single complete theory that can directly be applied to most real life tournaments observed in the economy. Instead a number of special theories with simplifying assumptions offer clues regarding the expected behavior of participants.
In Lazear and Rosen (1981) the authors show that a tournament can theoretically be superior to hourly wages by proving that, for risk neutral workers with uniform abilities, optimally structured tournaments yield results identical to piece rate pay and, if workers are risk averse, tournaments can be more efficient. The authors point out that they are unable to completely characterize the conditions under which piece rates dominate rankorder tournaments and vice versa. However, they do provide examples and observe that persons with more endowed wealth and smaller absolute risk aversion are more likely to prefer contests and those with low levels of endowed wealth and larger absolute risk aversion are more likely to prefer piece rates. The authors assume that the cost of effort is increasing and convex in effort. They argue that in the case of workers of heterogeneous ability it would be necessary to use credentials or other mechanisms to sort individuals into to the "right" contests if contests are to be efficient in the sense of participants choosing socially optimal levels of investment. Krishna and Morgan (1998) consider the optimal design of tournaments for homogenous workers. Unlike many other papers that further develop the ideas from Lazear and Rosen's pioneering paper, Krishna and Morgan focus on tournament design rather than comparing tournaments, piece rate pay or combinations of the two. The authors show that, regardless of risk preferences, winner-takes-all tournaments are optimal for up to three competing homogeneous workers. In this context optimal means the prize structure which induces the greatest total effort. In the case of four workers, the optimal structure of awards depends on the risk preferences of the participants. In the case of risk neutrality, winner-takes-all tournaments are again optimal. If workers are risk averse, the optimal tournament pays prizes to the winner and the runner-up. The authors assume that the cost of effort is increasing and convex in effort.
In Moldovanu and Sela (2001) the authors consider risk-neutral heterogeneous participants who differ in their cost of effort. In this context the authors show that winner-takes-all tournaments are optimal when the cost of effort is linear or concave in effort, while it may be optimal to have more than one prize if the cost of effort is convex in effort. The authors assume that ability is private information with abilities drawn independently from a known distribution. As in Krishna and Morgan (1998) , optimal means the prize structure that induces the greatest total effort. Moldovanu and Sela's assumption of privately informed heterogeneous participants and a deterministic relationship between effort and output contrasts with the papers discussed earlier where agents are identical and observed output is a stochastic function of unobserved effort.
In Szymanksi and Valletti (2004) the authors show that if output is a stochastic function of effort a second prize may be optimal if the contestants differ enough in ability. The authors show that in a three-person contest with one strong competitor and two equally weak competitors a second prize can be optimal from the point of view of eliciting maximum effort from every contestant. In this model whether or not a second prize is optimal depends on the difference in the cost of effort of the weak and strong players.
The authors assume that the cost of effort is increasing and linear in effort and that participants are risk neutral. Having surveyed some of the relevant theoretical literature, it is perhaps useful to assess how close the available models come to describing road running races. Although it is obviously simplistic and fails to reflect fully all the features of the models considered, Table 1 suggests two challenges. First, there is a challenge for theoretical economists to develop a more comprehensive theoretical framework. Second, since no directly relevant model exists, empirical economists need to develop a way to organize the data produced by many real world tournaments in order to understand them better and to suggest likely areas for fruitful theoretical work. This paper attempts to make a contribution in the second of these categories.
Experimental
In light of the complexity of many tournaments compared to the available theoretical models, experiments may provide a useful link between theory and real world tournaments. Harbring and Irlenbusch (2003) investigate different tournament design alternatives along two dimensions: tournament size and prize structure. Participants have homogeneous costs of effort and a predetermined number of prizes are awarded to those choosing the greatest effort. The authors find that average effort tends to increase and variability of effort tends to decrease with the number of prizes.
Orrison, Schotter and Weigelt (2004) use an experimental design in which the cost of effort is homogenous and output is a stochastic function of unobserved effort. Prizes are awarded to a predetermined number of those achieving the highest output. The authors found that behavior was invariant to tournament size (i.e., behavior is the same for tournaments with two players and one prize and say six players and three prizes). If the number of prizes was varied for a given number of participants, effort changed little 2 Of course there are many other interesting theoretical papers discussing one feature or another of tournaments. Although we have not presented a full review of all these papers here we believe that our conclusion would hold even if this exercise was to be completed.
although there was some evidence of effort declining if the number of prizes was very high.
It would seem likely that further areas of experimental research would be fruitful. In particular, investigating additional characteristics listed in Table 1 might assist in the development of a more comprehensive tournament theory.
Sports Related Empirical Studies
The economics of sports has received significant interest from researchers. Szymanski (2004) provides an extensive overview of sports economics. Below we briefly review two pairs of papers in this area that are relevant to tournaments. Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) and Orszag (1994) study professional golf competitions and Maloney and McCormick (2000) and Lynch and Zax (2000) study road running races. Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) use data from professional golf tournaments in US in
1984.
The authors' analysis is restricted to the top 160 money winners for whom the average score on all rounds during the year is available. The authors use these average scores as a proxy for each player's ability. Heterogeneity in the prestige of tournaments is accounted for by using a dummy variable for major tournaments. Controlling for the tournaments' characteristics, an individual's ability and the ability of other players, ordinary least squares analysis is employed to estimate the effect of total prize money on an individual's score. The authors find a negative coefficient for total prize money, which is larger if the analysis is restricted to those players that have been most successful recently. Orszag (1994) Is the balance between the efficacies of training prior to a competition (which improves performance for a number of different tournaments) and effort in the competition itself different for road running races so that the incentive effect in a particular race is meaningful and can be measured? As is the case of golf, the conclusions to date that can be drawn from the literature are contradictory. In both Maloney and McCormick (2000) and Lynch and Zax (2000) the authors endeavor to separate the anticipated positive relation between prizes and performance into incentive and sorting effects.
Maloney and McCormick use data for runners who won prizes in races that took place in the southeastern US over the years 1987 to 1991. The theoretical model proposed as a starting point is Lazear and Rosen (1981) with two identical, risk-neutral competitors.
Using time per mile as the dependent variable, the authors attribute the coefficient for the prize spread, defined as the difference between the prize won by each runner and the next lowest prize, to the incentive effect and the coefficient for the average prize to the sorting effect. On this basis the authors find both an incentive and a sorting effect.
Lynch and Zax use data from races organized in US and abroad in 1994. The authors show that without controlling for ability, runners seem to run faster if the prize difference is higher. In this context prize difference is defined to be the amount of prize money a runner would lose in a particular race if she finished one place below the position implied by her pre-race ranking rather than at the position implied by her pre-race ranking. The pre-race ranking was constructed using 1993 world road rankings. Once ability was taken into account using fixed effects or 1993 rankings, the coefficient for the prize difference that would measure the incentive effect is neither of the expected sign nor statistically significant for almost all distances analyzed. Since after taking ability into account the apparent incentive effect seem to disappear, the authors conclude "that races with large prizes record faster times because they attract faster runners, not because they encourage all runners to run faster."
To date, the results of sports related empirical studies are at best ambiguous in validating tournament theories. This can be explained by either an identification strategy that does not separately quantify the selection and incentive effects of prizes or by the fact that sport tournaments are not appropriate for testing the tournament theories, or by both. If sports tournaments are to be a useful testing ground for theory in this area a necessary prerequisite is that participants respond to the observed incentives. If participants do not respond to the observable financial prizes, tournament theories are not invalided, after all it may be the case that participants are responding to other less readily observed incentives such as prestige or derivative financial incentives (such as endorsement income). However, if participants do not respond to financial prizes, the usefulness of sports tournaments to test tournament theories that are important in other areas of the economy disappears. One of the goals of our research is to determine whether in the context of road running races financial prizes can be seen to impact race choice and performance.
Econometric Model
In our model we assume runners make three decisions. First, runners decide whether to race in a particular period. Second, if they choose to race, runners determine in which of the available races to participate. Third, once they know the other race participants, runners choose the effort to exert in their chosen race. For simplicity we assume that: (1) the first decision is based on idiosyncratic factors that are independent from any of the factors that impact the second and third decisions and the runners' performances in their chosen races; and, (2) the disturbance terms in the equations that describe the attractiveness of the races, the "sorting equation", (relevant for the second decision) and runners' performance, the "speed equation", (relevant to the third decision) are independent. Assumption (1) allows us to model just runners' second and third decisions. Assumption (2) simplifies the estimation of the sorting and speed equations.
As discussed in the next section, in our analysis we look only at "top runners", which we define as male runners who (1) finish in the top 30 in at least one race in our data set and (2) finish in the top 150 in at least one additional race in the data set.
For each race we identify up to two most closely competing races based on the date on which the races take place, the distance between race venues and the lengths of the races.
In particular, the methodology to identify the most closely competing races used the following algorithm. First, only races occurring within a time period starting one weekend prior to the race of interest and ending one weekend after the race of interest were considered as candidate competing races. 3 Second, from the group of races occurring within the required time period we retained as candidate competing races only those races for which the venue was within 1,000 miles of the race of interest. Third and finally, from the remaining candidate competing races the two most similar in length to the race of interest were chosen. Applying this methodology to our data results in eight of the 71 races in our data set with top runner participation having no competing races, ten having only one competing race and the remaining 53 races having two competing races.
We assume that having decided to race in a particular period, a runner chooses between the race of interest and the most closely competing races only. If runner i has chosen to compete in a particular period, the relative attractiveness of race k is ik A . We assume that ik A is determined as shown in Equation 1.
In Equation 1 k x is a vector characterizing the prizes in race k and will include variables such as the total value of all prizes offered and the Herfindahl index of the value of the prizes offered, r i is runner i's ranking and ik  is a disturbance term that accounts for a runner's idiosyncratic race preferences (i.e., preferences unrelated to prizes and ranking).
For computational convenience we will assume that the disturbance term is i.i.d. extreme
value. We assume that ranking is a measure of a runner's ability. The methodology we use to calculate each runner's ranking is based on a runner's success in beating other runners and is discussed in detail later in this section.
If a particular runner participates in race k rather than any of the most closely competing races which we designate k then we know
. We define P ik as the probability of observing runner i participating in race k rather than any of the most closely competing races. Since we are assuming ik  is i.i.d. extreme value we can use a logit model to calculate P ik as shown in Equation 2.
Our estimates for the vectors  and  are the values that maximize the log likelihood function shown in Equation 3; this is the sorting equation. 4 As described in Appendix 1, in some cases individual runners participated in one of the two competing races that had been identified. In this situation P ik is defined as the probability that the relative attractiveness of the race the runner chooses not to participate in is less than the other two. If k and l are the races in which the runner participates and m is the one he does not, P ik can be written as:
For estimation purposes we parameterize the relationship determining the average speed for runner i in race k as shown in Equation 4; this is the speed equation.
In Equation 4 W k represents intrinsic race characteristics and will include variables such as race prizes, distance, distance squared, the topography of the race course and the prevailing temperature on the race day. X k represents global competitive intensity and includes variables relating to the group of top runners participating in the race such as the total number of top runners in the race. Y ik represents local competitive intensity and is related to the number of top runners competing in the race who are of similar ranking to the runner of interest. Unlike the earlier terms, this effect is specific to a particular runner in the race of interest. Our two measures of competitive intensity are designed to capture the intuition that individual effort (and therefore race speeds) will be influenced by the size and quality of the overall field and will also be impacted by the presence of runners of a similar ability. Z i includes personal characteristics of runner i such as ranking. The disturbance term, ik e , is intended to reflect all other factors impacting a runner's speed and is assumed to vary by runner and race. We use ordinary least squares to estimate the vectors a, b, c and d.
As discussed in Section 2, some prior researchers have used ranking information that is intended to reflect a runner's ability as an explanatory variable. In the case of road running, rankings are not available for all the runners who are of interest to us, and therefore we are required to develop our own ranking system. For simplicity we assume that the relationship between rankings and the probability of one runner beating another does not depend on race characteristics.
Considering the top runners in our data set we have a total of 7,377 pairwise tournaments where we observe one top runner beating another in a race. Our goal is to assign a ranking to each individual that results in the fewest possible number of "wrong" predictions (i.e., the smallest number of cases where the lower-ranked runner beats the higher-ranked runner) and which assigns plausible rankings to groups of runners that never interact. The algorithm we used to determine rankings had two parts. First, initial rankings were calculated based on each runner's won/lost count which is equal to the number of pairwise victories minus the number of pairwise losses for each runner. Using the initial rankings calculated in this way, the number of pairwise tournaments in which the worse ranked runner beat the better ranked runner was calculated. Second, we tried to improve the initial rankings through an iterative search. One of the incorrectly forecasted pairwise tournaments was chosen at random and the rank of the loser reassigned to the winner and the ranks of the loser and all the runners with rankings between the original rankings of the winner and loser were demoted by one ranking.
Using these revised rankings, the number of pairwise tournaments in which a worse ranked runner beat a better ranked runner was recalculated. If the number of incorrectly forecast pairwise tournaments was reduced the initial candidate rankings were replaced with the revised rankings. If the revised rankings did not reduce the number of forecasting errors the initial candidate rankings were not changed. Next another random draw from the incorrectly forecast pairwise tournaments based on the candidate ranking was taken and the process repeated. Using this methodology the initial proportion of incorrectly forecast pairwise tournaments was 13.7%. An iterative search consisting of 100 random draws reduced this to 12.0%. 500 draws reduced it to 8.0%. 1,000 draws reduced it to 5.9% and 5,000 draws reduced it to 5.1%. We used the rankings produced after 5,000 draws in our analysis.
5 5 An example may serve to demonstrate why our methodology would not be expected to eliminate all incorrect forecasts. In our data no top runner competes with another top runner more than four times. There are seven pairs of runners that meet exactly four times. In the case of five of these pairs the same runner wins on each of the four occasions that they meet. For the remaining two pairs the results are not consistent. In these cases one runner wins on three occasions and the other wins on the fourth. In this small sub-sample there are a total of 28 pairwise competitions (four for each of seven pairs of runners).
Description of the Data
Our data set was collected based on the information about races found in the As described in Section 3 we limit our analysis to what we term "top runners", defined as runners that finish in the top 30 in at least one race in our data set and in the top 150 in at least one additional race in our data set. We believe that these top runners are likely to be less subject to idiosyncratic reasons influencing race choice and race effort compared to less successful runners, and limiting our attention to these runners reduces computational complexity. This defines a revised data set consisting of 861 observations including 366 top runners in a total of 71 races. We observe a maximum of 42 top runners in each race and a minimum of one top runner. The maximum number of appearances by a top runner is six and the minimum two.
Summary information regarding the 71 races included in our analyses is shown in Table   2 . The Herfindahl index of prize values provides a measure of the dispersion of prizes in a race and was calculated in the usual way by taking the sum of the square of the ratio consisting of the value of each prize divided by the total value of prizes. Consequently, this index takes values between zero and one with a value of one corresponding to a single "winner-takes-all" prize while lower values correspond to more widely dispersed
Given the inconsistent performances, rankings would fail to correctly predict the results of two of the pairwise competitions, corresponding to a failure rate of approximately 7%.
prizes. In addition to the information shown in Table 2 , 13 of the races were classified as hilly, five as down hill, 33 as flat and 20 as topography unknown. Additional information regarding the 861 observations included in our analyses is shown in Table 3 . A particular advantage of our data set over those used in the analyses that dealt with foot races in the context of tournament theory reviewed in Section 2 is that it permits us to observe the effects of prizes on athletes who did not win prizes.
Results
In this section we discuss the results of estimating Equation 3 (the sorting equation) and Equation 4 (the speed equation) and the robustness checks we performed.
Equation 3: The Sorting Equation
As shown in Appendix 1, based on the algorithm we chose to identify competing races, out of the total of 861 observations 101 did not have any competing races and therefore 760 were suitable for use in estimating the coefficients in Equation 3. We first report results for estimating Equation 3 using a vector of variables to characterize race prizes ( k x ) that contains the total value of all prizes and the Herfindahl index of the prizes offered. We chose to specify k x in this way in the belief that prospective race participants might respond to both the overall purse of prize money and the manner in which it was divided between different prizes. The total value of all prizes and the Herfindahl index of the prizes appears to be a parsimonious way to capture these two features of the prizes offered in a particular race. Table 4 indicates the magnitude, standard errors and p values for the coefficients estimated using maximum likelihood. As can be observed from Table 4 , it appears that in our data the total value of prizes and the total value of prizes interacted with a runner's rank are relevant to a runner's choice of race. The coefficients for both of theses variables are statistically significant at the 5% level. Neither of the coefficients relating to the variables including the Herfindahl index of prize values is statistically significant. The results from estimating Equation 3 using k x consisting of only total value of prizes as shown in Table 5 . As expected, for highly ranked runners (i.e., runners with a ranking number that is low), increasing the total value of prizes offered increases the attractiveness of the race. For less highly ranked runners this effect is more muted. Using the point estimates of our results, we can conclude that the runner ranked 294 th is indifferent to total prizes when choosing between races and for runners that are ranked below 294 th increasing total prizes actually reduces the attractiveness of a race. Using the delta method we estimate the standard error for the point of indifference ranking to be 60 ranking places.
We explored the robustness of our reported results for the sorting equation by estimating a number of additional model specifications. First, we would like to check if our results are sensitive to the way we defined the competing races for the race of interest. As a consequence, we considered two alternative methodologies. Second, we are interested to see if prizes influenced the prize winners in choosing the races in a different way than it was the case for the rest of the participants. Our data allows us to perform this analysis and we re-estimated our original model using only observations where the runner was awarded a prize and observations where the runner failed to win a prize. Table 6 compares our base case methodology for determining competing races with the two alternative methodologies. Table 6 Comparison of Methodologies for Determining Competing Races Of the 861 observations included in the data set used in our analysis, in 205 the runner was awarded a prize in the race of interest while in 656 he was not. We re-estimated the sorting equation using only the prize-winning observations and only the non prizewinning observations. In both cases the signs of the coefficients for the variables involving the total value of prizes did not change and the coefficients were statistically significant at the 10% level. As before, the coefficients for the variables involving the Herfindahl index of prize values were not statistically significant.
Further information regarding the results of the robustness checks involving the sorting equation is included in the first table in Appendix 2. On balance the robustness checks support our choice of model specification described earlier.
Equation 4: The Speed Equation
The estimated coefficients for Equation 4 are shown in Table 7 . The dependent variable used in the regression is average speed measured in units of meters per second. The results for each component of the speed equation are discussed below.
W k (intrinsic race characteristics):
We find that prizes impact average speed, which is consistent with the direct incentive effect. Average speed increases with the total value of the prizes offered and as the Herfindahl index of prize values decreases. These effects are modest in size. An increase in total prizes by $10,000 is predicted to increase average kilometers is estimated to reduce speed by only 0.20 meters per second. As indicated by the hilly course and down hill dummies, compared to a flat course a hilly venue reduces average speeds while a down hill course increases speeds. The dummy variable if course topography is unknown is not statistically significant. This dummy variable was employed if it was not possible using the information provided by race organizers to confidently categorize the race as hilly, downhill or flat. The fact that the coefficient is not statistically significant is consistent with the hypothesis that the races assigned to this category were not predominately of one type or another or that these unassigned races were in fact flat. The coefficients of the average temperature and average temperature squared variables are not statistically significant.
X k (global competitive intensity):
We used one variable in this category; the number of top runners participating in the race. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level. As expected, as the number of top runners in a race increases, so does average speed. All other things being equal, the results imply that a race with 10 additional top runners will have speeds that are approximately 0.04 meters per second faster.
Y ik (local competitive intensity):
After some experimentation we chose a single measure of local competitive intensity which appeared to have the greatest explanatory power: the number of competitors within 20 ranking places of the runner of interest. The estimated coefficient, which is statistically significant at the 10% level, indicates that a single additional runner close in ranking to the runner of interest is expected to increase his average speed by approximately 0.02 meters per second.
Z i (personal characteristics of runner):
Ranking is the only variable in this category. As expected, better ranked runners (i.e., those with lower ranking numbers) are predicted to run faster. All other things being equal the runner with ranking 1 is predicted to have a speed that is approximately 0.35 meters per second faster than the runner that is ranked 101. This coefficient is significant at the 1% level.
In order to investigate the robustness of our reported results, we estimated a number of alternative model specifications for the speed equation. First, we omitted runner rankings as an explanatory variable. This resulted in a substantial reduction in the reported R squared from 0.83 to 0.54. The reported coefficients for total value of prizes and Herfindahl index of prizes retained the same signs, were statistically significant, and were greater in absolute value than in our earlier analysis. These results are consistent with our assumption that ability is an important determinant of speed and that our rankings are a good measure of ability. As expected, the omission of a measure of ability reduced the model's explanatory power and upwardly biased the absolute values of the coefficient for total value of prizes since when rankings are omitted we fail to account for the fact that on average races with more attractive prizes include runners of higher ability. Second, we added two additional interaction variables to the model: runner ranking multiplied by total value of prizes and runner ranking multiplied by Herfindahl index of prizes. Neither of the new variables was statistically significant. Third, we re-estimated the sorting equation using only the prize-winning observations and only the non prize-winning observations. Using only the prize-winning observations the coefficient for the total value of prizes was larger than in our base case analysis and was statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient for the Herfindahl index of prize values, the number of top runners and the number of top runners within 20 ranking places were no longer statistically significant. Using only the non prize-winning observations the coefficient values for the total value of prizes and the Herfindahl index of prize values were similar to those reported for the base case and both were statistically significant at the 10% level.
The coefficients for the number of top runners and the number of top runners within 20 ranking places were both statistically significant at the 10% level. The results for the prize-winning and non prize-winning data are consistent with both groups responding to the total value of prizes with those who win prizes responding to a greater extent. While we can not reject the hypothesis that prize winners are insensitive to the dispersal of prizes and the other top runners in the race, non prize-winners appear to respond positively to more dispersed prizes, more top runners in the race and more closely ranked runners in the race. Fourth, we estimated a version of the model that excluded local competitive intensity. In this case the coefficients for the total value of prizes and the Herfindahl index of prize values were similar in magnitude to those reported for the base case and were both statistically significant at the 5% level. Fifth, we estimated the model with runner fixed effects. The coefficient of total value of prizes was statistically significant at the 1% level and was approximately unchanged in magnitude. The coefficient for the Herfindahl index of prizes was no longer statistically significant at the 10% level.
Further information regarding the results of the robustness checks involving the speed equation is included in the second table in Appendix 2. Overall the robustness checks we undertook provide some additional comfort that the version of the model we presented earlier in this section is reasonable.
Possible Endogeneity of Rankings and Additional Robustness Checks
Our methodology for determining rankings described in Section 3 uses runners' observed and so Y ik and Z i may be correlated with e ik . Therefore as we have specified Equation 4, Y ik and Z i may be endogenous and consequently the coefficients we estimate for Equation 4 could be biased. This potential problem is partially addressed by the fact that the ranking for runner i depends not just on e ik but on the disturbance terms for runner i in all the races he participates in our data set and indirectly on the disturbance terms for other runners. In addition, rank ordering may be less influenced by e ik than would a continuous ability metric. The comparison of our base case results from estimating the speed equation with the fixed effect results leads us to believe that the possible endogeneity issue is not sufficiently large to place our qualitative conclusions in doubt. We discuss in more details the potential impact of endogenous rankings in Appendix 3. We conclude that we are unable to predict the direction and size of the bias for each coefficient, only that it could be relatively modest in size.
As an additional robustness check, we estimated both the sorting equation and the speed equation using alternative rankings based on the results of the speed equation using fixed effects. As before, rankings were assigned from 1 to 366. The runner with the highest dummy variable coefficient was assigned ranking 1 and the one with the lowest ranking Some discussion about why we prefer our base case formulation of the speed equation to one using fixed effects analysis is warranted. As discussed above, we have used the fixed effect analysis as a robustness check. As such it offers additional support for our conclusions. However, we believe that our base case approach that uses rankings based on the observed outcomes of pairwise tournaments is more useful. First, as we have constructed it, rankings are needed in the sorting equation and they allow us to create a measure of local competitiveness for use in the speed equation: we believe these to be worthwhile contributions. Second, using rankings allows between runner comparisons to contribute to the estimation of the coefficients in the speed equation. This might be particularly useful if there is little observed variation in some variables within runners.
Third, a continuous measure of ability based on the estimated values of the coefficients of the runner dummies from the fixed effects analysis would be endogenous and, as is usually the case with fixed effects, the estimated values would not be consistent. Fourth, although rankings based on rank order using the estimated runner dummy coefficients might help address the endogeneity issue (this requires the disturbance terms to be small compared to the differences between the fixed effects dummy coefficients), we believe that our approach for rankings is more robust. For example, by using between runner comparisons our ranking approach is less likely to be distorted if runners had preferences for unobserved characteristics of the races that influenced race speeds. In summary, we believe using rankings is beneficial and that our ranking approach reduces some of the shortcomings that arise if rankings based on the results of a fixed effects analysis are employed.
Counterfactual Analysis
In order to illustrate the expected impact of changing race prizes we consider the predicted result of a hypothetical change in the prizes offered in race 8. This race was chosen since it has only one competing race (race 28) and has only a limited number of top runner participants (five). These characteristics make the arithmetic for calculating the expected consequence of changing prizes a little easier than it would be for other races. The principles that would need to be applied are the same in all situations, including those where there are two competing races and where the number of top runners is large. Race 8 and race 28 are of the same distance (8 kilometers), occurred on the same day (June 16, 2002) and took place at relatively nearby venues (Boston in the case of race 8 and New York City in the case of race 28). The actual prizes for race 8 and the hypothetical revised prizes are shown in Table 8 ("CV i ") at which the runner is indifferent between race 8 and race 28. Assuming the runner is ranked better than 294 th , CV i is less than UB i . In this case, the probability that the runner would choose race 8 at the hypothetical prizes while he chose race 28 at the actual prizes is equal to the probability that the true value of
is between CV i and UB i conditional on
since p a is the probability
exceeds UB i and p h is the probability it exceeds CV i . If the runner is ranked worse than 294 th , race 8 is made less attractive to runner i by the increase in prizes.
Under these circumstances a runner who chose race 28 at the actual prizes would never switch to race 8 at the hypothetical prizes and, since
Thus, the probability of a runner participating in race 8 at the hypothetical prizes conditional on the fact that at the actual prizes he chose to participate in race 28 is the larger of In a similar way for the five top runners that actually participated in race 8 we can calculate the unconditional probability of each runner choosing race 8 at the actual and hypothetical prizes. For runner j these probabilities are represented by a p and h p respectively. The fact that runner j was actually observed to have participated in race 8 places a lower bound on the value of
("LB j ") that corresponds to the value at which the runner is indifferent between race 8 and race 28 at the actual prizes. At the hypothetical prizes there is a revised critical value of
("CV j ") at which the runner is indifferent between race 8 and race 28. Assuming the runner is ranked worse than 294 th , CV j is greater than LB j . In this case, the probability that the runner would choose race 8 at the actual and hypothetical prizes is equal to the probability that the true value of
This is equal to shows these probabilities.
In the case of the top runners originally in race 28, for eight runners the probability of defecting to race 8 exceeds 10%, for three runners the probability is between zero and 5% and for the remaining seven runners the probability is zero. In order to simplify the analysis only those runners with a 10% or greater chance of defection will be considered in the remainder of the discussion. In the case of the five runners originally in race 8, based on the hypothetical prizes three are estimated to remain in race 8 with certainty while two are estimated to defect to race 28 with a probability of less than 5%. For simplicity the possibility of defections away from race 8 will be ignored in the remainder of the analysis. Based on these simplifying assumptions the probability of at least one runner from race 28 joining race 8 if the hypothetical prizes were introduced is 0.7 and the expected number of runners defecting from race 28 to race 8 is 1.2. This is the sorting effect in action. Now we turn to the incentive effect of the hypothetical revised prizes on the runners already committed to race 8. We call the predicted effect of the revised prizes before taking into account the impact of runners defecting into race 8 the "direct" incentive effect. We call the total effect of the hypothetical prizes when allowing for defections the "combined" incentive effect and the difference between these two effects the "indirect" incentive effect. As shown in the third table in Appendix 5, we estimate the combined incentive effect to be of the order of 0.5% of the runners' original times. Except in the case of the top ranked runner in race 8 the direct incentive effect represents the overwhelming majority of this predicted change in speed. For the top ranked runner in race 8 the indirect incentive effect is larger than is the case for the other runner since for this runner three of the runners that may defect from race 28 are within 20 ranking places and therefore the local competitive effect has a positive impact on the runner's predicted speed.
As we have chosen to model them, the direct incentive effect is common to all race participants while the indirect incentive effect can vary between individuals since the hypothetical change in prizes can result in changes in local competitive intensity that differs between runners of different rankings. In the particular example that has been worked out here the direct incentive effect is larger the indirect incentive effect. Of course, this may not be true for other races and other runners.
Conclusions
Tournaments of many types are important in the economy. In many cases data are difficult to collect and, as a result, to a large extent empirical analysis has not been available to support the development of theory. If it can be shown that participants respond to the observed financial prizes, sports tournaments may offer a fruitful area for study that complements research in areas of more direct interest but where data may be limited and of poor quality. In a sense sports tournaments provide an analytical bridge between laboratory experiments and economically important tournaments. In the case of laboratory experiments data are of high quality but the applicability to other economically important tournaments may be questioned. In the case of a direct study of say work place promotions, the applicability is clear while high quality data may be scarce. Sports tournaments stand between these two extremes and may play an important part in furthering understanding. This paper's contribution is fivefold. First, we elaborate a two-part model to separately quantify the sorting and incentive effects of tournament prizes. We believe that in this setting our approach is novel. Second we apply the model to a unique data set of road running race results. Since, unlike the data sets used in prior studies we are aware of, the one used here includes runners that did not win prizes, it allows us to observe the impact of prizes on the race choice and the speed of all runners, not just prize winners. Third, we use concepts of global and local competitiveness to estimate effects that relate to the overall competitiveness of a race and the local impact of runners of similar rank to the runner of interest. Fourth, we demonstrate that in the races we examine participants do indeed respond to financial prizes and both sorting and incentive effects are present.
These conclusions are robust to a number of alternative specifications of the sorting and speed equations. Fifth, we present a counterfactual example showing how a hypothetical change in prizes would be predicted to change race participation and speed. Table 10 Robustness Checks for the Sorting Equation
Standard errors are reported in parantheses. "*", "**" and "***" indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively Base specification using only 96 Standard errors are reported in parantheses and are adjusted for clustering by race. "*", "**" and "***" indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively (1) refers to the specification without runner rankings (2) refers to the specification with additional interaction terms (3) refers to the specification using only prize-winner observations (4) refers to the specification using only non prize-winner observations (5) refers to the specification without the local competitive intensity (6) refers to the specification using runner fixed effects
Appendix 3: Possible Endogeneity of Rankings
In this part we address two issues related with the possibility that rankings might be endogenous. First, we discuss the character of the endogeneity and second, we are interested in predicting its anticipated impact on our estimates.
Below there is a simplified representation of the speed equation. 
Taking probability limits and recognizing that, since we can reasonably assume that V and e and V and u are uncorrelated,
Since we only expect measurement error in the ranking measure and for simplicity ignoring any effect it could have via local competitive intensity, u is a matrix of zeros except for the column corresponding to rankings. Therefore
is a column vector of zeros except for the element corresponding to runner ranking which has a value equal to the covariance of u and e. As discussed above, we would expect this covariance to be negative. Similarly,
is a column vector of zeros except for the element corresponding to runner ranking which has a value equal to the variance of u multiplied by the true coefficient for runner ranking. Thus we expect These estimated values are shown in the first column of Table 12 . The second column of Table 12 normalizes the values by dividing them by the corresponding coefficient from Table 7 .
The bias introduced to the estimates of each of the coefficients in the speed equation from the measurement error in rankings, u, and its correlation with the disturbance term, e, is estimated by multiplying the appropriate value from the first column in Table 12  we are stymied in predicting the direction and size of the bias for each coefficient. We are however able to predict whether or not pairs of coefficients will be biased in the same or opposite directions and from the second column of Table 12 we can see that on a relative basis the coefficient for total value of prizes is estimated to be the most biased. 7 7 Although we are not able to calculate the direction and magnitude of the bias, plausible "guesstimates" suggest that it could be relatively modest in size. For example, if we assume that the correlation coefficient of u and e is -0.1, the standard deviation of u is 20, the variance of e is equal the MSE in the base case estimate of the speed equation (0.27307) and β runnerranking is equal to the coefficient for runner ranking in the base case estimate of the speed equation (-0.003458), the implied bias for the coefficient for total value of prizes is positive and corresponds to approximately 2% of the estimated value. Note that the estimated fixed effects dummy variable coefficients used to produce the results shown in Table 14 range in value from -1.85 to 0.36 with a mean value of -0.57. Since a high value of the fixed effects dummy variable coefficient corresponds to a fast runner, we would expect the final two coefficients shown in Table 14 to be of opposite sign to the results produced using rankings where a fast runner is assigned a low ranking number. Table 16 shows the probability of runners originally in race 28 choosing to defect to race 8 at the hypothetical prize levels. Table 17 shows the probability of runners originally in race 8 choosing to remain in race 8 at the hypothetical prize levels. Table 18 shows the predicted impact of the hypothetical change in prizes on the speed of all the top runners already committed to race 8. Note that the runner ranked 82 was the first placed top runner with a time of 1,574 seconds. The race had a length of 8km and so this winning time corresponded to an average speed of 5.1 meters per second. For this runner the predicted combined incentive effect corresponds to an increase in speed of approximately 0.6%. The runner ranked 343 was the slowest of the top runners in this race with a time of 1,927 seconds. In this case the predicted combined incentive effect corresponds to an increase in speed of approximately 0.5%.
